Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications (apps) provide convenient and low cost means for users to communicate and share information with each other in real-time. Day by day, the popularity of such apps is increasing, and people produce and share a huge amount of data, including their personal and sensitive information. This might lead to several privacy issues, such as revealing user contacts, private messages or personal photos. Therefore, having an up-to-date forensic understanding of these apps is necessary.
INTRODUCTION
In the recent years, we have witnessed a rapid increase in the use of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services as an online communication method on mobile devices. This is not surprising due to the increasing penetration of smartphones: it has been predicted that by 2019 the number of smartphone users will be more than 2.6 billion [1] . These days, people use their smartphone devices not only for making voice calls and exchanging SMS, but also for obtaining several services which are offered due to ubiquitous access to Internet, such as mobile banking, and location-based services. Meantime, the use of VoIP applications, which could be delivered easily through mobile VoIP applications (mVoIP apps), would enable people to interact, share information, and to become socialized at a very low cost compared to most of the traditional communication techniques.
However, such applications could also be exploited by criminals or be targeted by cybercriminals (e.g., with malware infection to steal financial data) [2, 3] . For these reasons, mobile devices (including smartphones) attracted a lot of attention from the security research community [4] , in particular from the perspective of malware [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] , security enforcement [13, 14, 15, 16] , and authentication mechanisms [17, 18, 19] .
Smartphones are a common source of evidence in both criminal investigations and civil litigations [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] . However, the constant evolution and nature (e.g., closed source operating system and diverse range of proprietary hardware) of mobile devices and mobile apps complicates forensic investigations [26] . Among the existing smartphone operating systems in the market, Android dominated the market with more than 80% of the total market share in 2015 Q2 [27, 28] . Therefore, Android popularity attracted several researchers to focus on investigating several different security aspects of Android, ranging from user identification [29, 30] , feasibility of encryption methods on Android [31] , cloud storage apps forensics [32] , and social networking apps forensics [3] . Due to the increasing use of mVoIP apps for malicious activities on different platforms including Android, forensic investigation of such apps needs an extensive coverage [33, 34] , and therefore in this chapter, we provide an investigative study of the three popular VoIP apps for Android on Google Play (see Table 1 ), namely:Viber [35] , Skype [36] , and WhatsApp [37] . The features of these VoIP apps are summarized in Table 2 . In particular, we aim to answer the following question: "What artifacts of forensic value can be recovered from the use of Viber, Skype, and WhatsApp Android apps?". Table 1 : Number of installations for each application [35, 36, 37] .
Application
Number of Google Play Downloads and Installations as of March-2016
Viber 100,000,000 -500,000,000
Skype 500,000,000 -1,000,000,000 WhatsApp 1,000,000,000 -5,000,000,000 
RELATED WORK
These days, several trusted and untrusted providers lunch various category of applications for mobile devices. This has lead to the ever increasing trend in using mobile devices in order to benefit from the services offered by these applications. This tendency motivated the forensic community to concentrate on forensic investigation of the mobile devices. In this regard, Dezfoli et al. [26] perused the future trends in digital investigation and determined that mobile phone forensics is receiving more and more attention by the community and is one of the fastest growing fields. In [38] They showed that useful artefacts are recoverable using this model, including databases, user account information, contact lists, images and profile pictures.
They could also discover timestamps for notifications and tweets, as well as a
Facebook authentication token string used by the apps.
There is also a vast interest of digital investigators in studying the instant messaging artefacts in the stream of research in this area of digital forensics.
The first claimed work to carry out a forensic analysis of Skype on the Android platform [55] investigated both the NAND and RAM flash memories in different scenarios. Their obtained results showed that chat and call patterns can be found in both of NAND and RAM flash memories of mobile devices, regardless of whether the Skype account has been signed out, signed in or even after deleting the call history. In [34, 56] , the authors showed that, whilst conducting recoveries of digital evidences relating to VoIP applications in computer systems, the Skype information is recoverable from the physical memory.
Moreover, [57] presents another forensic analysis of several instant messaging applications including Skype and WhatsApp focusing on encryption algorithms used by these applications. Similar work has also been conducted by forensically analyzing WhatsApp on Android platforms [58, 59] . In the same line of study, a forensic analysis of four popular social networking applications (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Google+) have been carried out which showed that artefacts useful as evidence in a potential criminal investigation are recoverable from smartphone devices using such applications [3] . Moreover, Yang et al.,
suggested an approach for forensics investigation of instant messaging applications on Windows 8.1 and applied it for detecting remnants of Facebook Instant
Messaging and Skype application. Another important research direction which has always been a concern for digital investigators in investigation of instant messaging applications is privacy [60, 61, 62] . Ntantogian et al. [63] evaluated thirteen Android mobile applications focusing on the privacy. They tried to recover artefacts that provide information relating to authentication credentials.
They showed that, the users' credentials are recoverable in the majority of the applications. Moreover, they determined specific patterns for the location of such credentials within a memory dump. In another research study [64] 
EXPERIMENT SETUP
Our investigative methodology is based on the digital forensic framework
proposed by Martini and Choo [51] . In this study, we first identified the potential evidence sources and set up the experimental environment (Section 3.1).
Thereafter, we carry out logical acquisition in order to collect evidential data (Section 3.2). Finally, by analyzing the collected data, we investigate possible remnant artefacts (Section 3.3). We further demonstrated and discussed the experimental results in Section 4, and presented the conclusions drawn from our investigation in Section 5; both of which exemplify the third and fourth steps of the framework methodology [51] , i.e., 'Examination and Analysis' and 'Reporting and Presentation', in which the results of the forensic study should be analyzed and presented appropriately.
Due to the fact that without a rooting the smartphone device, we would not be able to access some of the stored files (we will explain in Subsection 3.2), we utilized a rooted Android phone, i.e., Samsung Galaxy S3 GT-i9300, in order to conduct our experiments. We set up and configured necessary workstations and tools (including both software and hardware), as listed in Table 3 . Moreover, Table 4 reports the authentication methods required for our considered mVoIP applications, and their details.
Our examination and analysis process consist of three phases, which we explain in the following. 
Phase I-Setup Phase -First Iteration
The first phase of our study is to identify and preserve the source of evidence, which is the first iteration. In this phase, we downloaded three mVoIP applications from the Google Play Store and installed on a Samsung Galaxy S3
GT-i9300 smartphone. For WhatsApp and Viber applications, an active mobile SIM is required to activate the application, while Skype could be activated by the username and password of the registered account (see Table 4 ). For each application, we performed several activities, as described in Table 5 , continuously for one month before the logical acquisition. 
Phase II -Logical Acquisition
The smartphone device that we used for the experiments, i.e., Samsung
Galaxy S3 GT-i9300 Firmware version 3.0.31, was originally not rooted. How-ever, without a root access on the phone, many data files would be inaccessible. Therefore, we used Odin3 (version 3.07) tool [66] to root the device by uploading the rook-kit frameware (CF-Auto-Root-m0-m0xx-gti9300) to the device. The installed root-kit gives the user root access, i.e., the user has the privilege control over the OS, which allows the user to attain privileged control within the Android's sub-system, and bypass the limitation placed on the device by the manufacturer. The root access grants the user the privilege to access a certain protected directory that holds some of the artefacts needed for this experiment (e.g., [root]/data/directories). The needed directory is then backed up and later accessed with the use of other tools mentioned earlier (see Table 3 ). The procedure that we adopted in our data acquisition is forensically sound according to [49] ; however, there are other methods to acquire logical image on Android devices without having to root the device.
After rooting the phone, the bit-by-bit physical acquisition of dd image is acquired using the following SSH command: 'sshroot@(Device IP Address) dd if=/dev/block/mmcblk0p12 | of=(Location on your computer). The "mmcblk0p12" (which might be different in several devices) is the internal memory block of the Android device, which is 16GB and so, it takes hours to be fully acquired.
This phase of the experiments leads to acquisition of the logical image of the Android device, which is considered to be the most crucial phase in mobile forensics investigation process, as the generated hash values play a vital role when presenting the case in court of law [67] .
Phase III -Identification and Analysis -Second Iteration
This third phase of the experiment includes identification of folders and files on the logical image acquired in the previous phase. Examination and analysis of the files in order to check the existence of artefacts such as time-stamps, location, GPS coordination, contact info, text-chat, SMS, file location and any significant data that could be relevant to the research area. We conducted forensic examinations manually, with the aid of the tools listed in the Table 3 .
After acquiring the logical image, as described in Phase II, we used "AccessData FTK Imager" to analyze the acquired dd image which resulted in the creation of the directory default path. This allows us to access all the files in each directory, and therefore navigating to each one of the files. Figure 1 shows the three folders of the our three under investigation applications, Viber, Skype, and WhatsApp
Messenger. After identifying these folders, in the next step, we need to carry out a deep inspection on each application's database to know whether we can find any potential evidentiary artefact. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section describes the potential artefacts found in each mVoIP application's directory. Furthermore, we discuss the evidentiary values of the artefacts found for each of the mVoIP applications.
Viber Artefacts
This subsection describes the Viber artefacts found in both manual forensic analysis and using IEF tool. We found two unique database directories after examining dd image with the FTK imager for Viber application, which are:
• [root]/data/com.viber.voip/databases/viber data.db
• [root]/data/com.viber.voip/databases/viber messages.db
The Viber application has two databases: viber data.db, which contains the same information as wa.db in WhatsApp; and viber messages.db, which has the same information as msgstore.db in WhatsApp application. Once again, using rooted device enabled us to access the database information in plaintext format. The viber data.db file contains data related to the outgoing calls, Viber contact names and numbers. In this experiment, we considered no blocked numbers; however, in case of having some block numbers, they would be recoverable as well. All these potential artefacts have evidentiary value relevant to a forensic investigation. On the other hand, the viber messages.db file stores geographical location information, contacts and all the sent or received messages in a chat database. Through preforming a forensic examination on this database, one would be able to determine the message exchange and also the actual source and destination of each exchanged message. With the aid of the IEF forensic tool, it is possible to determine whether a particular message was either sent or received by a particular sender or a recipient. These artefacts are useful in helping a forensic investigator to determine if a particular suspect is worth taking to court.
Skype Artefacts
In order to examine the Skype application, after obtaining the dd image in the same way as Viber and WhatsApp, we used the IEF tool. We discovered This may help tie a subject to a particular IP address and activity originating from that address. Having found artefacts like name, email, mobile number, date of birth, gender and country, it would be easy for a forensic investigator to further carry out the investigation based on what has been found and also to geographically point to where the relevant subjects reside.
WhatsApp Artefacts
In this subsection, we describe the WhatsApp Messenger artefacts that we found in this investigation. In fact, by examining the dd image with the FTK imager tool, we found out three unique directories: two of them are databases, while one is a directory path.
• [root]/data/com.whatsapp/files/Avatars/60xxxx@s.whatsapp.net
• [root]/data/com.whatsapp/databases/wa.db
We could find the avatar icon of each contact in the WhatsApp application, along with user related MD5 and SHA1 hashes which have evidentiary value, since they can be directly linked to a particular WhatsApp account, and hence can be used to identify the user who is using this account. Alongside the avatar pictures, the name and phone number of the user are also valuable to forensic specialists.
Since we used a rooted device in the experiments, the database appeared in plain text format. We discovered that, the records and logs of all the activities carried out by the user that are listed in Table 5 are stored in two different database files: wa.db, and msgstore.db. The wa.db file contains all the information relating to the contacts including the contact names, contact phone numbers and WhatsApp status. These artefacts can be of great value to actually track down suspects, for example, a certain WhatsApp status update may betray information relating to a criminal activity. Having these kind of artefacts, a digital forensic specialist would be able to potentially relate the status to an actual incident and back up their case accordingly. On the other hand, the msgstore.db contains artefacts with timestamps relating to sent and received text-chat messages, images, videos and audios. By analyzing the same database using IEF tool, we could obtain the source and the destination of each message in order to detect the actual sender and receiver of each message.
We summarized the results acquired from our investigation in Table 6 So far only a few research studies have explored and addressed the forensic recovery and analysis of activities carried out on social network and instant messaging applications on smartphones. These work provide limited information in terms of logical acquisition and artefacts recovery. In contrary, our study explored the forensic acquisition, examination and analysis of the logical image of a smartphone. Our experiment consisted of: i) installation of three top-rated mVoIP applications, ii) carrying out the usual user activities on each of these applications, followed by the acquisition of the logical image using a forensically sound approach, and iii) performing a manual forensic analysis on each of the installed mVoIP applications. When carrying out such a digital forensic examination, however, there could be some potential obstacles which could make accurate data recovery difficult. For example, there are many varieties of lock screen apps, app lock, SMS and picture locks; some of which encrypt the data stored on the mobile device, and also lock the device interface [68] . This could be an issue for a digital forensic specialist when examining such a device. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter, we carried out a forensic analysis of the most popular mVoIP applications, i.e., Viber, Skype, and WhatsApp Messenger when running on an Android smartphone. Artefacts listed in Table 6 can provide vital evidence that can open up a case or offer a wealth of information for further investigation when dealing with crime related to mobile devices and mobile applications.
This study successfully applies a methodology adapted from an existing digital forensics framework, which uses various techniques from the existing literature, in order to perform a forensic analysis of Viber, Skype, and WhatsApp
Messenger applications on an Android platform. We showed that potential evidentiary artefacts can be found on Android devices, which have forensic value to be presented in the court of law by a forensic investigator when handling a case related to cyber terrorism or cybercrime conspiracies. A possible future research direction could be a comprehensive research on different mobile operating system platforms, considering another mVoIP apps. This would provide vital information for digital forensic specialists.
